Until November 8, 1967, women could not, by law, constitute more than two percent of the total military personnel in the armed forces.' Even with the lifting of this statutory bar, women are not yet an integral part of the armed services, comprising only 1.9 percent of the total personnel. 2 This low level of participation undoubtedly reflects a widespread feeling among women as well as men that combat is essentially a male activity, but it may also be the result of the numerous statutes, regulations and informal policies that disfavor women at every level of the military hierarchy. 3 Many of these sex distinctions have been discarded during the last decade in response to a resurgent concern for the rights of women. 4 Others persist, however, reflecting the continuing belief of military and legislative decision-makers that generally women are inadequate or inappropriate substitutes for men in many military positions. 5 The prevailing policy of the military, as a representative of the Air Force expressed it, is that personnel policies and procedures should be made essentially the same for men and women "except where there are legitimate rational reasons to do otherwise."O This test may not even satisfy existing judicial standards. The Supreme Court recently divided evenly on the issue of whether sex is a suspect classification 7 . In Frontiero v. Richardson, 8 four Justices declared that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." 9 Lacking clear direction from the Supreme Court, several state and lower federal courts appear to be developing an intermediate standard of scrutiny in reviewing sex-based classifications." 0 Congress may have obviated resolution of this issue by passing the Equal Rights Amendment, which, if ratified by the states, would require an even more stringent standard than advocated by the four justices in Frontiero. This Note will discuss some of the more significant distinctions between men and women that still exist in the military, and assess the constitutionality of these differences under the proposed Amendment.
I. Interpretation of the Equal Rights Amendment
The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) states that:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."' 7. Previously, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) . the Supreme Court appeared to have used a rational basis test to invalidate a state statute which provided that when equally qualified male and female applicants apply for appointment as administrators of an estate, the man must be chosen. However, since the requirements of the rational basis test were not satisfied, the Court did not have to reach the issue of whether the strict scrutiny test could have been applied. 8. 41 U.S.L.W. 4609 (U.S. May 14, 1973) . The Court invalidated 37 U.S.C. § § 401, 403 (1970) and 10 U.S.C. § § 1072, 1076 (1970), which provided that married male members of the armed services automatically receive increased quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits for their spouses, whereas married female members must first establish that their husbands are, in fact, dependent on them for more than one-half of their support. It ruled that these provisions constituted discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
9. Id. at 4612. Justices Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall reached this conclusion. Justices Powell, Burger and Blackmun concurred in the judgment of the Court, but would have based the decision on Reed without reaching the issue of suspect classifi. cation. In a single sentence concurrence, Justice Stewart did not explicitly side with either of these approaches. He concluded that the statute in question worked "an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution," id. at 4613, a term traditionally reserved for strict scrutiny cases, but he also cited Reed, indicating sympathy for the view expressed by the other Justices in concurrence. Because of the breadth and vagueness of this language, courts would undoubtedly look to legislative history in interpreting the Amendment. 12 An examination of congressional hearings and debates reveals that Congress adopted a strict interpretation of the Amendment, a position originally propounded by Professor Thomas Emerson and three students from the Yale Law School."a Under this approach sex could not be a factor in determining the legal rights of women or men. To achieve the values of group equality and individual self-fulfillment, the Amendment would have to be applied comprehensively:
The issue under the equal rights amendment cannot be benefit or detriment, reasonable or unreasonable classification, strict scrutiny, compelling reasons or the demands of administrative expediency. Equality of rights simply means that sex is not a factor. 1 However, the Emerson interpretation does incorporate two important exceptions to this rule of strict equality. First, the Amendment would not preclude legislation which takes into account a physical characteristic unique to one sex. 15 The exception is, however, limited to physical characteristics-and does not extend to psychological, social, or other perceived sex differences-because only physical characteristics can accurately be described as unique to one sex. 1 G Distinctions justified by this exception would have to be closely scrutinized to insure that they were legitimate and narrowly drawn.', 12 . It has been argued that, since the states will be ratifying the language of the Amendment itself and not a committee report, courts would look solely to the words alone, and not to the legislative history, in applying the Amendment. 118 Co.*c. RPc.
S 4377 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Stennis); Hearings on 11J. Res. 208 Before Subcomm. 4 17. Professor Emerson and his associates identified six factors which a court should balance in determining whether the necessary close, direct, and narrow relationship exists between the unique physical characteristic and the regulation at issue: (1) the proportion of women or men who actually have the characteristic in question; (2) the rela-Second, the Emerson framework stresses that the ERA would have to be harmonized with the overall structure of the Constitution. Laws or administrative action implementing the ERA would have to be applied in a manner consistent with such preexisting constitutional rights as individual privacy.' 8 The Emerson interpretation was praised by the two principal proponents of the amendment, Congresswoman Martha Griffiths ' and Senator Birch Bayh, 20 and referred to with approval in the Congressional Reports. 21 According to ERA opponent Senator Sam Ervin, the Yale Law Journal article in which that interpretation is set forth will constitute "primary legislative history" of the Amendment. 22 More generally, the framework outlined in the legislative history parallels the Emerson interpretation in every relevant respect.
2 3 tionship between the characteristic and the problem to be solved; (3) the proportion of the problem attributable to the unique physical characteristic; (4) the proportion of the problem eliminated by the solution; (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives; (6) the importance of the problem ostensibly being solved, as compared with the costs of the least drastic solution. Id. at 894-96.
Examples of laws which could be permissible ate those which concern wet nurses and sperm donors, establish medical leave for childbearing, and determine paternity. little attention has been paid to the momentous changes that it would require in the structure and policies of the armed services themselves.25 Although the legislative history does not include a detailed examination of this problem, there was sufficient discussion to warrant the conclusion that Congress intended the Amendment to be fully applied to the military. 26 It is well established that a citizen does not relinquish his constitu- tional rights when he enters the armed forces. 2-Service personnel are entitled to all constitutional rights except those which are expressly withheld by the Constitution or by necessary implication inapplicable. 28 Rights have been said to be "impliedly inapplicable" when they conflict with the requirements of "military necessity" by seriously impairing the discipline and morale of the armed forces..
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The doctrine of military necessity has been considered in a number of decisions involving due process and First Amendment rights. 3 0 In each of these cases the rights involved were balanced against the peculiar needs of the military. Such accommodation is required even when fundamental constitutional rights are involved, 31 because the doctrine of military necessity is also of constitutional dimension, deriving from the authorization to raise and maintain armed forces. 32 As such, even those changes required by the ERA would have to be balanced against the military's need to maintain a minimum level of discipline within the services. 33 However, only those measures which would substantially impair discipline or morale-which would, in other words, effectively deprive Congress of its ability to raise and maintain combat forceswould present a sufficiently direct conflict between the two constitutional doctrines to require accommodation. 34 To maintain discipline and thus to maintain an effective army, it is necessary for Congress to strike a balance between the rights of individuals and the methods by which the services are to maintain discipline. In so doing, the balance struck must sometimes infringe upon normal civilian individual rights. When our continued national existence is at stake, individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution may could be said to exist if the military's overriding disciplinary needs could be satisfied through means less drastic than the creation of sexbased classifications. 35 The vast majority of sexual classifications that presently exist cannot be justified by legitimate military necessity or by any of the other recognized exceptions to the ERA. This Note will examine existing military policies 30 and regulations to determine the changes necessary to bring them into conformity with the Amendment.
A. Getting In

Enlistment
Although the statutory limit on the number of women in the service has been lifted, 37 the Secretary of each branch of the service can prescribe the authorized strength of female enlisted and officer personnel. 38 For a variety of reasons, including inadequate training facilities, 39 the Secretaries have chosen to limit the number of women in the military to less than two percent of all service personnel. 4 0 In all the services women are subject to more exacting enlistment criteria relating to minimum age and parental consent requirements. 41 have to give way, for it is not possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution. in which the former Chief Justice equated "military necessity" with "national survival."
35. Certainly the rights granted by the ERA, stated as they are in absolute terms. must be assigned at least as high a value as other individual liberties. In the case of the latter, it is well-settled that only interests and needs which cannot be satisfied in any other manner can be balanced against them. Lewis, Freedon of Speech-An Examination of the Civilian Test for Constitutionality and Its Application to the Military, 41 MIL. L. Rv. 55, 79 (1968) . See also Miller, supra note 32, at 54, in which the author limits the requirements of military necessity to "the minimum power essential to enforce discipline in the armed forces (and thereby preserve national security) .... " 36. This Note deals with the effect that the ERA would have on four services: the Army, the Navy, the Marines, and the Air Force. It does not deal with the special problems of the Coast Guard, the National Guard, or the Reserves, although most of the anal)sis below is relevant to these services as well.
37. See note 1 supra. 38. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § § 3209, 3215, 8208, 8215 (1970). 39. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12444 (testimony of Gen. Bailey). The fact that women today comprise only about 13,000 of the more than one million Arm) personnel, id. at 12440, is justified in part by the fact that all basic training of female enlistees in the Army takes place at Fort McClellan, Alabama, which has a capacity of only 6,000Z enlistees. See Watson, Fact Sheet, Expansion of the Women's Army Corps, on file with the Yale Law Journal. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has established one percent of the total Marine enlisted strength as a goal for the strength of enlisted women. One of the reasons cited for this ceiling is the lack of training facilities. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12458 (testimony of Colonel Sustad).
40. See p. 1533 supra. 41. 10 U.S.C. § 505 (1970) sets out the qualifications for original enlistment in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Men applying must be not less than 17 years of age, whereas women must be not less than 18. Written parental consent
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They must also have higher scores on mental aptitude tests and more educational credentials than their male counterparts. 42 Although women in the Army are barred from strenuous training 4 and from various occupational specialities which require "heavy" labor, 4 4 they must meet a minimum physical standard stated in more stringent terms than that imposed on males. 4 5 Finally, men who have dependent children may enlist under the normal Army procedures, but women must first obtain a waiver.
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Most of these enlistment differentials are justified on a theory of supply and demand: Since more women, but fewer men, apply than are desired by the services, the standards for women are set at higher levels. 4 7 This reasoning, based as it is upon judgments concerning the useis necessary to enlist a male under the age of 18 or a female under the age of 21. These distinctions are defended as a means of "protecting" youn; women from "making rash and immature" decisions and of providing the services "with a screening device by requiring wise and objective judgment of the interested parent or guardian." Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12498 (testimony of General Bailey).
A bill to make the minimum age of enlistment in the armed forces the same for both males and females was introduced in Congress on October 4, 1971, H.R. 11064, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), and received great attention from the branches of the service. See, e.g., Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12500 (testimony of Captain Qulgley). However, it died in the Armed Services Committee of the House and would have to be reintroduced.
42. To enlist in the Army men need only to meet the educational requirements of the specific option for which they are enlisting, not all of which require completion of high school. Women, however, must possess either a high school diploma or certification of passage of the equivalency exam. In addition, women are given a different battery of mental aptitude tests, and it is argued that since the scores are not couiparable, the minimum qualifying scores are not required to be equal. Williams, Army Fact Sheet, Army Enlistment Standards for Men and Women, Aug. 7, 1972, on file with the Yale Law Journal. An attorney in the office of the General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense stated:
All of the services have indicated to me that in general the minimum standards on test results and educational level required in order for a person to enlist or be an officer are generally higher for women than for men. Speech by Carole L. Frings, DACOWITS Fall Meeting, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Nov. 12-16, 1972 , at 11. See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
43. See note 76 infra. 44. See p. 1547 infra. 45. The consistency with which minimum physical standards are applied-with respect to both men and women-may be open to doubt. But the regulations are stated in undeniably different terms. For example, potential women Army enlistees must be able to perform with maximum effort for "indefinite" periods, to take "long" marches, and to withstand long periods of standing. Men are only ineligible if they have delfects which would prevent "moderate" marching, and their ability to perform with maximum effort need only be for "long" rather than "indefinite" periods. The psychiatric standards for women are also more stringent. See Appendix VIII, Physical Profile Functional Capacity Guide, C22, AR 40-501, June 19, 1968 (in document dated Aug. 7, 1972) , on file with the Yale Law Journal. In the Marine Corps the physical profile for entry of women is also higher than that required for men. The Navy and Air Force have the same physical profile requirements for females as for males. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
46. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17. This differential also exists in the Marine Corps. Id. Until recently, both services also required a waiver for all married women, id., but the Army cancelled this restriction, effective April 20, 1973 . N.Y. Times, March 27, 1973 47. Speech by Frings, supra note 42, at 11.
fulness of an entire sex rather than of the individuals that comprise it, would be unacceptable under the ERA.4 s Instead, minimum standards with regard to age, education, and mental and physical ability would have to be identical for men and women. Both sexes would have to be subjected to the same tests, except to the extent that certain medical criteria would be permitted to deal with the unique physical characteristics of each sex.
The courts might decide, as they have in employment discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 40 to supplement this rule of identical treatment with safeguards against more subtle forms of discrimination. Thus intelligence tests would have to be carefully scrutinized to insure that they are actually testing general intelligence -or skills specifically needed by the military-rather than a familiarity with male-oriented items in our present culture1 0 High physical standards or skill requirements which eliminated a large proportion of women might also be challenged as unnecessarily restrictive at a time when eighty-five percent of military jobs are noncombatant.5 t With regard to such a challenge, the services and ultimately the courts would [T]he first impact of this equal rights amendment as far as the military services are concerned would be to say that any woman who wants to serve her country will have the opportunity to do so, and will be either admitted or denied on the basis of the same grounds used to admit or den) men. But see Speech by Frings, supra note 42, at 12-13, which suggests that the Amendment could be interpreted to permit the services to choose the most qualified men and women, adjusting the test standards and educational qualifications in order to get enough men and enough women for their particular needs. This view would not require that the standards be identical for both men and women, but would instead allow the military departments to pick the "cream of the crop" among both men and women applicants. This interpretation is inconsistent with the EILVs basic premise that judgments must be based on individual characteristics rather than the perceived characteristics of an entire sex group. See note 23 supra.
The requirement of individualized selection would also invalidate distinctions based upon sex-role generalizations. For example, the special waiver requirement for women with dependent children could not be justified by either the observation that mothers spend more time with young children than fathers or the judgment that they ought to do so. 
Officer Procurement
With undisguised bluntness the military services discriminate against women in the procurement of officers. Female applicants to the Army Officer Candidate School (OCS) are required to have completed two years of college, whereas male applicants need only have a secondary school education. 53 Direct appointments to a number of positions in the Navy and Marines are statutorily restricted to males. 4 Custom and regulation prohibit women from being considered for admission to the three major military academies,r 5 even though they are not barred by statute. 56 Finally, the military's ROTC program was until recently completely closed to women 57 and even now is available only on a limited, experimental basis. 58 52. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Court sustained black cmployees' contention that an employer's requirement of a high-school education or passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a job condition violated Title VII, because neither of these requirements was related to the jobs in question); 2 CCH EMI'LOY. PRAc. GUIDE § 6286 (1971) (employer who applied a minimum-height rule to job applicants of both sexes found to have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, since evidence revealed that the height requirement would be satisfied by the average male but by only twenty percent of the females and that such a requirement was not justified as a business necessity). 54. 10 U.S.C. § § 5575, 5576, 5577, 5587 (1970) . These restricted career areas in the Navy are the Supply Staff Corps, the Chaplain Staff Corps, the Civil Engineer Staff Corps, and officers designated for engineering, aeronautical engineering, and special duty. Women in the Navy and Marines also may not be limited duty officers. 10 U.S.C. § 5589 (1970).
53.
Women similarly are barred from the aviation cadet program, into which civilians and enlisted members of the Navy and Air Force can be commissioned. Under the ERA, officer candidacy requirements and methods for procuring officers would have to be identical for men and women. Although qualifications would not have to be standardized for all the services, the requirements for commissioning within each service would have to be the same for men and women,59 and no path could be closed to either sex. For example, both the proponents 60 and the opponents 6 ' of the Amendment have asserted that its passage would require the service academies to admit women on an equal basis with men. 
62.
The Directors of Women in each of the services have defended the sexual segregation of the academies on a variety of grounds: They argue that a sufficient number of qualified women are acquired through other procurement sources, that the academies are geared to combat from which women are excluded, and that integration would not be economically worthwhile. See, e.g., Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12471, 12493 (testimony of Capt. Quigley); id. at 12496 (testimony of Gen. Baile)): id. at 12471 (testimony of Gen. Holm).
These considerations, however, would not suffice to prevent integration. Under the Amendment, no mere state interest, such as administrative convenience or fiscal necessity, could justify a sex classification, see p. 1535 supra, and combat could not be wholly closed to women, see pp. 1550-52 infra. Furthermore, a recent study by the Air Force found that there exists no significant economic impediment to the sexual integration of the Air Force Academy. Interview with Gen. Holm, Director of Women in the Air Force, Washington, D.C., Dec. 6, 1972. General Holm has concluded that the continued segregation of that facility derives more from a lack of commitment to the training of women leaders than to any of the arguments listed above. an appreciable number of women at one base, a separate women's company will be created within a battalion.a Under the ERA the WACs and all other remnants of separate women's corps would have to be eliminated.," Although the Supreme Court has never found sexually "separate but equal" facilities to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, such facilities would be impermissible under the ERA. The proponents of the Amendment have pointed out that the separate treatment of two groups, one of which has previously been treated as inferior by the law, can never in fact be equal. 0 7 Moreover, separation by sex is indisputably classification by sex-and that is forbidden by the ERA. 8 Congress evidently did not intend, however, that sexual integration encompass integrated living facilities. The legislative history shows that the constitutional right to privacy was thought to permit the military to maintain separate living quarters for men and women, so that they would not be forced to undress or perform personal functions in the presence of the opposite sex. 6 This argument is dependent on two unsettled legal conclusions: that the right to privacy protects The primary function of maintaining a separate Women's Army Corps will probably be eliminated. Whether those distinctions based on sex that would remain pernnis. sible under the amendment will be continued through a separate label for female members is primarily a question of policy. However, the impact of the equal rights amendment, in my opinion, will so limit the permissible distinctions that It would be inaccurate to designate female members as belonging to a separate corps, as that term is used to designate separate branches within the Army. individuals from the embarrassment that would result from forced cohabitation and that the right so interpreted extends to military personnel. 7 0 Neither conclusion, however, is unreasonable. First, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment privacy right encompasses "[t]he desire to shield one's figured [sic] from view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex .... ",, Second, while the military may legitimately deprive its personnel of much of the privacy guaranteed to civilians, such deprivations must always be justified by compelling interests of discipline or morale. " Since living quarters are now segregated throughout the military, it is unlikely that the services would assert, or the courts declare, that the protection of sexual privacy through such an arrangement contravenes the doctrine of military necessity. Thus the courts would be justified in validating Congress' conclusion that the right to privacy, when balanced against the ERA, would permit the limited separation of the sexes for sleeping and toilet purposes." The precise degree to 70. For an examination of the similar assumptions behind Congress' conclusion that prison sleeping areas could be kept segregated, see Note, supra note 10, at 1259 n.157.
Reprinted in Speech by
71. Ford v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (police officer held to have violated the Fourth Amendment right of a woman who had come to the police station to report an assault. Over her objection, the officer had taken photographs of her in the nude and circulated them among the police personnel at the station. The court stated that "[wje cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked body," the shielding of which is "impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity." Id. at 455). Although the right to privacy is arguably broad enough to en. 73. Since privacy is an individual right, the possibility of waiver raises special problems. Presumably, if a group of service personnel waived their right to be housed separately, the Equal Rights Amendment would require that they be assigned quarters on the basis of sex-neutral criteria, which might result in voluntary coeducational sleeping facilities. While the content of the privacy right may be determined by reference to societal mores, such mores in the absence of the privacy right are not of constitutional dimension and cannot be used to defeat the Amendment's ban on sex classifications.
See note 23 supra. However, it is possible that individual rights which require detailed government re.lation-such as the rights to privacy and the equal protection of the laws in the military, public school, or prison context--cannot be waived. which entire housing facilities could be kept separate is not clear, 7 " but Professor Emerson has suggested that courts and administrators may look to the current mores of the community regarding relations between the sexes in determining the scope of the privacy exception."
Basic Training
All enlisted recruits receive some form of basic training before being trained in their occupational specialties. In each of the services such training for males stresses discipline and physical development, while that of women is focused on administrative subjects. 0 A similar disparity characterizes officer basic training. 7 Moreover, training units are sexually segregated,T frequently at different bases. 70 These differences undoubtedly reflect the disparate utilization of men and women in the military. After ratification of the ERA the services would still be permitted to adapt basic training to probable later assignments if they so desired, but placement in a particular training program could not be based on an overbroad sex classification. 0 In other words, a man and a woman would have to receive identical basic training, unless an examination of the individual physical capability or assignment potential of each dictated different pro- 76. In the Army women are trained in professional development (benefits of military service, community services, leadership, personnel policies, etc.) but are not trained to be "traditional" military professionals. Watson, Fact Sheet, supra note 39. Although physically qualified, see note 45 supra, they do not take long marches or utilize their hand-to-hand combat potential. The closest that WACs come to combat training Is two days of field training that "has the air of a well-disciplined group of girl scouts on a camp-out." Phillips, On Location with the WACs, Ms., Nov., 1972, at 62. In the Navy shipboard organization and rugged physical training are excluded from the female program. Interview with Captain Quigley, Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Women, Washington, D.C., Dec. 5, 1972. Instruction for women in the Marines includes subjects such as the application of make up, how to avoid trouble, and how to wear a uniform. grams. A few differences in the physical training of all women might be justified by the unique physical characteristics of the sexes, but such differences would have to correlate closely with the characteristics in question and could not be based on the generalization that women are weaker than men. 8 1 Although the nature of the training given men and women would thus have to be almost identical, the training units themselves could still be segregated to the limited extent required by military necessity and privacy. The services might argue that discipline and teamwork cannot be instilled in the basic trainee unless the unit with which he sleeps remains discrete and sexually segregated throughout the training period .82 The burden would be on the military to prove that such separate but equal training units 8 3 are essential to the discipline and effectiveness of the armed forces. 84 The right to privacy would only demand that sleeping and bathroom facilities be kept separate, which could be accomplished through segregated barracks or perhaps only separate sections or floors within a single building. s3
Occupational Specialties
The military occupational classification (MOS) system is designed to identify, classify, and relate skills and personality characteristics to military job requirements. 8 6 In the Army women are specifically excluded from those MOS associated with combat, close combat support, hazardous duty, and strenuous physical activity, as well as those that would require their assignment to an isolated area. 8 7 As of July 81. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 893.94. 82. This claim might be based on a perceived critical need for intensie group interaction and for depriving trainees of the company of the opposite sex.
83. Under the less drastic means analysis, see note 35 supra, separation of the sexes would be limited to the smallest unit necessary to satisfy the requirements of privacy and discipline.
84. See note 114 infra. 1972, medical and dental specialties and administrative personnel accounted for the occupational specialties of 94.6 percent of the enlisted women in that service. 8 8 Similarly, women are excluded from more than half of the army officer MOS. 89 Although the "Navy's intrinsic mission [is] as a seagoing operating force," 90 women cannot be assigned to duty on naval vessels other than hospital ships and transportsY 1 Furthermore, sea duty or even "eligibility for command at sea" is often an important qualification in the selection for officer shore assignments. 9 2 Finally, the "restricted line," a broad officer classification encompassing the more technical occupational specialties, is statutorily closed to womenY 8 As a result of these restrictions, Navy women are concentrated in personnel jobs. 0 § 6015 (1970) . Women have served aboard Navy ships only with medical staffs on hospital vessels and transports belonging to the Military Sealift Command. Washington Post, Feb. 15, 1972 . at A3, col. 5. Admiral Zumwalt's Z-gram 116, CNO nmsg 071115Z Aug. 72, noted that a limited number of officer and enlisted women were being assigned to the regular ship's company of the U.S.S. Sanctuary, a recommissioned hospital ship, as a pilot program. Although Z-gram 116 also authorized "limited" entry of enlisted women into all ratings, the statutory prohibition against assigning women to combat ships still exists, so that actual assignment policies are unclear.
92. NR-0836 (1948) states that "the officer detailed as Commandant of a naval district shall be an officer of the line in the Navy eligible for command at sea," Thus women officers, whose career patterns should qualify them for just such leadership as. signments, are arbitrarily excluded. Denby, Command Opportunity and Flag Grade for Women Officers, June 19, 1972, at 23-24 (unpublished thesis at U.S. Naval War College).
93. See note 54 supra. Theoretically, women in the "unrestricted line," encompassing most other officer assignments, can be designated for temporary duty in a restricted line community not involved in sea duty.
94. Coye, supra note 5, at 12484, citing Bureau of Naval Personnel Computer Printout, April 29, 1971. Commander Denby concluded after studying the opportunities for female officers that there was "irrefutable evidence that women officers have stagnated in a relatively limited number of career paths primarily in administrative areas." Denby, supra note 92, at 61. See also Coye, supra note 5, at 12476.
with men in about two-thirds of the enlisted Marine MOS." Women Marine officers are also restricted to two-thirds of the available MOS fields.
9 6 Moreover, a regulation specifically states that women officers may succeed to command only over those activities which have the administration of women Marines as their primary function.
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By contrast, only five officer career fields in the Air Force are closed to women, and these are all associated with aircraft which might be engaged in combat missions. 98 However, half of the male officers are concentrated in the pilot and navigator categories,"" which are two of those closed to women as a matter of Air Force policy.' 00 The number of specialty fields open to enlisted women has recently been expanded, but few women have yet been assigned to these new fields. 2 0 1 The primary reasons for the exclusion of women from various occupational fields, whether by law or regulation, are physiological and cultural. Some jobs are considered to be beyond the physical capabilities of women.
102 Others, most notably combat and sea duty, 96. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12461 (testimony of Colonel Sustad). The twenty-three MOS available to female officers are not the same as the twenty-thre considered suitable for enlisted women. For example, enlisted female personnel may be trained in logistics, but officers may not; officers may be in the Supply Services, but enlisted women may not.
97. Interview with Colonel Sustad, supra note 65. 98. 10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1970) prohibits the Air Force from assigning women to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions.
99. Interview with General Holm, supra note 62. 100. Id. Thus, as in the Navy, women "airmen" are excluded front one of the primary missions of the branch of the service of which the) are considered full members.
101. Although, as of June, 1971, ninety-eight percent of enlisted career fields were technically open to women, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 25, as of July of the following year three-quarters of enlisted women were still administrative specialists and clerks. Id. at 26.
102. The Air Force excludes women from such jobs as telephone lineman for this reason. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12451 (testimony of General Holm).
103. When asked about the justification for restricting women from seagoing positions, Captain Quigley replied:
I would say first of all that you have to look at the sociological picture, and I do not think that this country, societally speaking, is ready for women sailing sub. marines under the sea and commanding aircraft carriers across the waters. their usefulness as administrators and personnel officers, the services may also feel that they are needed to provide a skilled continuity base.105 Finally, women may be excluded from some training programs because, in the places where that skill is needed, a woman cannot be sent for other reasons. 1 0 0 Most revealing is the attitude that women would serve in a much larger number of service positions (as they did during World War II) if there were a national emergency.
0 7
Under the Amendment all occupational specialties would have to be open equally to men and women. The basic principle of the ERA that the law must deal with individual attributes means that sex would be an impermissible factor in determining the selection of a career field. The principle enunciated in the Congressional Reports is echoed throughout the testimony and debates: Particular women may be barred from jobs for which they are not fitted, just as particular men do not serve in those positions for which they are not qualified, but blanket prohibitions based on sex are impermissible.'
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Application of the ERA to combat presents special problems, because countervailing constitutional provisions are of particular importance in this area. For example, it has been argued that the right to privacy might exclude women from at least some combat duty if sexually Title VII provides that it shall be an "unlawful employment practice" for an employer engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce, who has twenty.five or more employees, to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970) . Although the statute's basic proscription against sex discrimination is absolute on its face, one significant qualification is included. The provisions do not apply "in those certain in. stances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business enter prise . 42 U.S.C. & 2000e-2(e) (1970). This "bfoq" test is similar to the Equal Rights Amendment's "unique physical characteristics" exception. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 13, at 926.
105. Coye. supra note 5, at 12480.
106
. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12486 (testimony of General Bailey). These reasons include: (I) In an "emergency" it might be necessary to send tile person filling a particular job slot to a combat area, and (2) housing or grade restrictions might preclude transfer of a woman to an area that requires a particular MOS, 107. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12445, 12467, 12486 (testimony of General Bailey); id. at 12502 (testimony of General Holm). In a speech to the American Bar Association, Rita Hauser, United States Representative to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, discussed the effect of the Amendment on the military:
I think that women should be judged in the same way as men. Some men make soldiers and others don't. Some bang at the typewriters and some do bandage work and similarly women will be judged on their capabilities for being soldiers or otherwise and not on the basis of sex. Reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. S 4374 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) . segregated sleeping quarters could not be provided or enforced. 1 00 While such considerations might justify the barring of one sex from a combat situation in which even minimal privacy is impossible, it would not justify a general reliance on sexually segregated combat units, much less the arbitrary exclusion of women from all combat duty. 110 The purposes of the Amendment could not be thwarted by assertion of the economic and administrative burden of providing some separate facilities on field bases and warships.
Perhaps with reference to the doctrine of military necessity, Congresswoman Griffiths and Senator Bayh indicated that the final decision regarding the use of a particular woman in combat would be a military prerogative. 1 ' One acceptable interpretation of these comments is that, taking into account the exigencies of battle, a commander in the field must be given broad discretion in deciding the role a given individual should play. 1 12 A broader interpretation would permit the military to limit the assignment of women to certain combat positions as a matter of policy if it could be demonstrated that further integration would impair discipline and military effectiveness to such an extent that the ability of the troops to operate in a combat situation would be seriously affected. 1 13 However, the military would be expected to test the effectiveness of integrated units in a variety of situations during the present peacetime environment and 110. The debate on Senator Ervin's proposed amendment to exempt women front combat duty, which was soundly rejected, see note 26 supra, reveals that set eral Senators contemplated that the ERA would require the assignment of women to front-line combat positions. See 118 CONG. REC. S 4395-4409 (daily ed. March 21, 1972) .
Congresswoman Griffiths stated:
The draft is equal. That is the thing which is equal But once )ou are in the Army you are put where the Army tells you where )ou are going to go. S. REP. No. 92-689. supra note 21, at 13. Senator Ba)h commented that once in the service, a woman would be assigned to duty where her commanders thought she was qualified to serve. A commander would not need to send a woman into the front trenches if he felt that it would not be in the best interests of the combat unit to make such an assignment. to produce empirical evidence establishing the necessity for any desired segregation to the satisfaction of the courts. 114 
III. Moving Up
Although many statutory limitations on the promotion of women to high ranking positions have been repealed, 1 5 the proportion of such positions actually filled by women is far smaller than the proportion of women in the military as a whole." 0 This discrepancy may be explained, at least in part, by continuing discrimination against women in promotion law and policy." 1 114. The imposition of such a burden is justified by the fact that military fears concerning sexual integration could too easily be based upon impermissible assumptions about proper sex roles and the capabilities of women, which might be disproved over time in the face of successful performance by qualified women and the education of service personnel concerning the value of such integration. The government should therefore be required to undertake experiments with sexual integration at all levels and to prove to the courts by clear and convincing empirical evidence that those levels that have not been integrated cannot be operated under such conditions because of the overriding requirements of military necessity.
A similar burden has recently been placed upon states which seek to provide different criminal sentencing schemes for male and female offenders. While such differential treatment was once routinely left to the discretion of the state, see Note, supra note 10, at 1245, several courts now require "substantial justification" for this sexual distinction, "empirically grounded to the greatest extent possible." New Jersey v. Costello, 59 N.J. 334, 346, 282 A.2d 748, 755 (1971 Stpp. 9, 11, 246 A.2d 106, 107 (1968); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968) .
115. Until 1967, VAC promotion to the grades of captain, major, and lieutenant colonel could be made only to fill vacancies in those grades, whereas male officers could be considered without regard to vacancies. 10 U.S.C. § § 3299(f), (g) (1964), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 3299 (1970) . Also repealed at that time was Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85-861, § 1(80)(E), 72 Stat. 1479, which prohibited WAG reserve officers from being promoted above the grade of lieutenant colonel, and 10 U.S.C. § 3215 (1964), as amen-ded, 10 U.S.C. § 3215(a) (1970), which placed a two percent lilnit on the percentage which the prescribed authorized strength in female warrant officers bore to the total authorized strength of the Army in warrant officers. 10 U.S. C. § 5462 (1970) women, yet even in that service there is a comparatively low number of female officers. Air Force General Holm stated that the large ratio in the lower grades was "due in large part to the expansion of the force in recent years," and that because of past promotion restriction there are few women coming up through the system who have the Although enlisted women compete with enlisted men for Army promotion, separate promotion eligibility lists are maintained for WAC officers." 1 " Navy and Marine enlisted women compete for promotion with their male counterparts in their skill specialty.'" o Females may not, however, be considered for selection as limited duty officers, 120 an officer designation to which enlisted men who have served for a number of years in a specific technical field may be promoted. Navy and Marine women officers are considered for promotion through the rank of captain by separate selection boards. 1 2 ' Although the selection boards for male officers continue to supervise promotion to the highest ranks, women may only be appointed above the grade of captain (to flag rank) by order of the Secretary of the relevant service, and then only when there is a position of sufficient importance and responsibility to warrant such a designation and it is determined that the person best qualified to fill that position is a woman. Moreover, any woman officer so appointed reverts to her permanent grade when she is detached from the flag position, 2 2 although men retain their rank.
Since separate but equal treatment would be forbidden by the Amendment unless required by privacy considerations or military necessity, 12 3 all vestiges of separate promotion systems would have to be eliminated, even if the military could demonstrate that the re- If you are an enlisted man in the Navy you are sLx times as likely to be an E-6 as an E-1 [the lowest rank]. If you are an enlisted woman, you are more than twice as likely to be an E-I as an E-6. There are almost as many commanders in tc Navy as there are ensigns, unless you're a woman, in which case there are three ensigns for every commander. Stat. 378 (1967) . The appointment and promotion of women officers are governed by laws separate from those dealing with male officers. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 5703, 5704, 5760, 5767(c), 5771 (1970) . A statute which specified the number of years a male officer in the Navy or Marines had to serve in one grade before he could be considered for promotion to the next higher grade was suspended by Exc, Order No. 11,437, 3 C.F.R. 142 (1968 Comp.) , but a similar section pertaining to women officers has not been suspended. See 10 U.S.C. § 5752 (1970) . Another statute provides for the temporary promotion of officers in time of war or national emergency. Male officers in the Navy in the grade of ensign or above and in the Marines in the grade of second lieutenant or above may be so promoted. Only female ensigns and second lieutenants may be promoted in this manner. 10 U.S.C. § § 5787, 5787(b) (1970 quirements for advancement were equal for each sex. 12 4 It has been argued that these rules presently serve a valuable function, since women cannot fairly compete for promotion with men so long as they cannot serve in combat or command men. 12 -However, since the Amendment would modify or eliminate these discriminatory prohibitions as well, 120 this justification need not immediately concern the courts.
IV. Getting Out
Although recent statutory reforms included the repeal of a number of laws which provided for the involuntary retirement of women officers at an earlier age than men,'1 2 7 remnants of these discriminatory provisions remain. 28 In addition, service regulations provide that a woman may be terminated whenever it is established that she, whether married or single, is the parent of a minor child, is pregnant, has given birth to a living child while in military service, or has become a parent or stepparent of a minor child. ' 1 2 To compound this in-equity, there is no provision for the payment of severance pay to regular officers in the Army and Air Force involuntarily discharged for pregnancy-1 3 0
Under the Amendment, retirement provisions within each service would have to apply equally to men and women. Retirement differentials based on specialty corps would be permissible, since the ERA would require integration of all such units. However, those provisions which allow extensions for male officers only would not survive.
Discharge policies would also have to be reformulated after passage of the ERA. The rules with regard to bearing or having a minor child would undoubtedly be eliminated, since their extension to men would virtually eliminate all career officers. Distinctions between single and married women who bear children would be permitted only if the same distinction were drawn between single and married men who father them.
Rules requiring discharge because of pregnancy present a special problem.1al Since pregnancy is a physical condition unique to women, the military would be permitted to enforce regulations which apply solely to pregnant women. However, such regulations must be narrowly drawn and not unduly harsh. A "problem" of legitimate concern would have to be identified (such as the danger of job-related injuries) and a sufficiently close relationship between the problem and the physical characteristic of pregnancy would have to be shown. 32 The military would in every case have to select the alternative-e.g., transfer rather than discharge-that would have the least drastic ef- 130. 10 U.S.C. § 687 (1970). With certain exceptions, a nonregular officer involuntarily released after five or more years of continuous active military service is entitled to a readjustment payment of two months' basic pay for each year of senice. This payment is payable only to nonregular officers separated involuntarily for pregnancy. General Holm reported that many young Air Force women decline to consider or accept regular appointments because of this rule. Utilization Hearings, supra note 2, at 12502.
131. The Supreme Court will soon have a chance to clarify the existing due process and equal protection limitations on pregnancy rules for government emplo)es. A series of lower court decisions, employing the uncertain degree of judicial scrutiny triggered by sex classifications challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, are in substantial conflict, and the Court has granted certiorari in two of these cases. By expanding the opportunities for women and allowing them to reap the full benefits of military service, these major changes required by the ERA would confer benefits upon society as a whole as well as the women directly affected. Servicewomen would gain increased economic and social independence, and important educational and career opportunities. Equal job availability in all areas of employment, both public and private, would be stimulated as women learned traditional "male" skills, and the military would be able to serve as a symbol to the nation of the sexual equality sought by Congress. ' The difficulties accompanying these changes, though substantial, would probably be temporary. The integration of women into the armed services would undoubtedly parallel in many ways the far more sweeping integration of blacks undertaken in 1948.30 In that year the services were ordered to drop their racial quota systems and to administer all assignments and promotions on an equal merit basis.
1 37 The Army in particular moved slowly in implementing these orders, with warnings of decreased efficiency and morale problems, but these fears proved largely unjustified. 138 Although racial 133. The services have discharged, rather than transferred, women in this situation, justifying the decision on legitimate military necessity. According to the court In Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37, 40-41 (D. Colo. 1972) (finding unconstitutional the Air Force regulation requiring discharge for pregnancy), transfer constitutes a less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose and must be used as an alternative to discharge.
134. For example, Air Force Manual 36-11 para. 3-1313, Jan. 29, 1971, provides for such a deferment when "a physical defect may be cleared within twelve months." The regulation identifies this deferment as compatible with the military need for "readiness and effectiveness of the fighting force." Temporary medical leaves are also granted for a wide variety of ailments. Almost without exception, commanding officers stated frankly that, although they had recognized the merits of the new Air Force racial policy . . . they had been apprehensive. Without any exception, they added that they were amazed with the ease with which the new policy had been effected and the absence of trouble.
problems have not been eliminated in the services, the program of integration was largely successful and served as an important example to civilian society.' 39 Like the integration of blacks, which took six years to complete, 14 0 the elimination of sex discrimination in the military cannot be expected to occur immediately. However, each branch of the service has already begun the task of reviewing its regulations and policies in order to comply with the ERA. 1 41 Furthermore, the Amendment would not take effect until two years after ratification, which may itself take up to seven years to complete . 42 This interim period, hopefully in a peacetime environment, should provide ample time for the transition. By combining the redrafting of laws and policies with an intensive educational program aimed at ameliorating friction and misunderstanding with regard to sex roles, 4 3 the armed services should be able to comply with the Amendment's mandate for equality of opportunity and treatment within the military.
139. See Begeman, supra note 137, at 15, quoting Kenworthy, see note 138:
It was the opinion of some officers that this program could not but have an effect. eventually, on civilian attitudes; that it was impossible for a white boy to live and work beside a Negro in basic training and in the technical schools without some real change taking place in his attitude toiward race and racial equality. 
